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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we discuss the main disadvantage of modern theory of economic growth, which 
is unable to predict the divergence of labor productivity growth between homogeneous 
economies. Under the term homogeneous economies we define the economies that possess the 
same human capital, have access to the same production technology, and experience equal 
growth of investments per labor-unit. In the article we describe that these conditions are 
significant for eight advanced transition economies that form EU8, and for 15 advanced 
market economies that form EU15. To overcome this basic disadvantage of modern growth 
theory we developed an original two-sector growth model and provide a theoretical analysis 
of divergence prediction between EU8 and EU15 economies. 
 
The article is divided into six different parts. In the first part we describe growth performance 
of EU8 and EU15 economies and discuss the equality conditions. In the second part we define 
the technical inefficiency as the basic problem that impedes convergence of labor productivity 
between EU8 and EU15 economies. In the third chapter we compose our original two-sector 
growth model aimed at explaining the convergence/divergence of labor productivity between 
homogeneous economies. In chapter four its explanation power is described in detail, while in 
chapter five we use the model for analyzing the divergence prediction between EU8 and 
EU15 economies. Chapter six concludes the article with main findings and suggestions for 
future research activities.  
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Introduction 
 
The paper deals with the issue of real convergence of eight advanced transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), which we term as EU8 economies, and 15 advanced market 
economies, which we term as EU15.2 There is no doubt that the EU8 economies have reduced 
their gap in terms of real gross domestic product per labor unit with respect to EU15 
economies. However an in-depth comparative analysis of the growth performance of EU8 and 
EU15 raises, from the theory of the economic growth point of view, interesting questions that 
attract our attention to set the question about the real convergence of EU8 with respect to 
EU15 economies as the main research issue.  
 
We recognize that EU8 economies tend to obtain a lower growth rate of labor productivity 
than EU15 economies at the same growth rate of investments per labor unit. Hence, the 
obtained convergence between EU8 and EU15 economies is the result of relatively higher 
growth of investments per labor-unit in EU8 economies. According to the modern theory of 
economic growth, this outcome can be explained through the differences in human capital and 
technological progress between economies, which should be in favor of EU15 economies. 
However, evidence on human capital indicators suggested that advanced transition economies 
are better endowed with human capital then advanced market economies.3 Additionally to this 
we have to recognize that both groups of economies (EU8 and EU15) belong to the common 
economic integration (European Union) that stimulates transfer of technology between 
economies. Considering these facts, the relatively lower growth of labor productivity of EU8 
economies with respect to EU15 economies, at the same growth of investment per labor-unit, 
is contrary to the theoretical predictions deduced from most recognized growth models of 
neoclassical and post-Keynesian growth theory. Hence, the modern growth theory is unable to 
predict divergence of productivity growth between economies in circumstances where they 
experience the same growth of investments per-labor unit, and have the same human capital 
and access to the same production technology. Therefore we regard the existing convergence 
theory as incomplete and discuss in the following content our original model aimed at 
upgrading the explanation power of modern convergence theory.  
 
                                                 
2 EU-member countries before enlargement in 2004.  
3 See for instance Barro and Lee (2001, 541–563) or Campos and Coricelli (2002, 808). 
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1 Productivity growth performance between EU8 and EU15 economies 
 
The central problem of EU8-countries with respect to EU15-countries can be clearly seen if 
we compare the growth of two main economic aggregates (investment per labor-unit and 
labor productivity) in the period 1996–2004. In Figure 1 are collected data on labor 
productivity growth for separate advanced transition economies and for EU15 economies as a 
whole. The results obtained are in line with our expectations – labor productivity growth in 
the period from 1996 till 2004 was higher in transition economies than in the advanced market 
economies. Henceforth, analyzing the official data on growth of output per labor-unit between 
EU15 and EU8 economies confirms the expected convergence. 
 
Figure 1: Labor productivity growth 
   
 
 
 
Note:  – growth rate coefficient of real gross value added in pps per labor-unit 1997/1996,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real gross value added in pps per labor-unit 2000/1999,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real gross value added in pps per labor-unit 2002/2001,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real gross value added in pps per labor-unit 2004/2003.  
 The horizontal axis indicates each of the separate economies, the vertical axes measure 
growth coefficient for labor productivity. 
 
Source: Own estimates on the basis of Eurostat data base.  
 
Next we calculate growth of investments per labor-unit (see Figure 2). As in the case of labor 
productivity also in this case we can establish higher growth for advanced transition 
economies, which is in line with the expected positive effect of the integration process.  
 
Figure 2: Growth of investments per labor-unit 
   
  
Note:  – growth rate coefficient of real investments per labor-unit 1997/1996,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real investments per labor-unit 2000/1999,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real investments per labor-unit 2002/2001,  
  – growth rate coefficient of real investments per labor-unit 2004/2003.  
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 The horizontal axis indicates each of the separate economies, the vertical axes measure growth 
coefficient of investments per labor-unit. 
 
Source: Own estimates on the basis of Eurostat data base.  
 
But an in-depth comparative analysis of the growth performance of EU8 and EU15 raises, 
from the theory of the economic growth point of view, interesting questions that attract our 
attention. Namely, by comparing the results from Figure 2 with those in Figure 1 we have to 
emphasize that there is a large difference in maximum values of dynamic coefficients. In the 
case of labor productivity growth the highest coefficient is approximately 1.14, where in the 
case of investments per labor-unit growth this value is more than 1.2. Therefore, to make our 
inferences more plausible we calculate two relative coefficients, termed as relative labor 
productivity growth ratio (rygr) and relative investments per labor-unit growth ratio (rigr): 
 15
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Symbols: rygr  – relative labor productivity growth ratio, 
 ygr  – labor productivity growth rate, 
 rigr – relative investments per labor unit growth ratio, 
 igr  – investments per labor-unit growth rate, 
 8EU  – EU8 economies, 
 15EU  – EU15 economies.  
Source: Own composition.  
 
The relative labor productivity growth ratio (rygr) measures the growth of labor productivity 
in EU8 with respect to the growth of labor productivity in EU15. If 1>rygr , then the growth 
of labor productivity is higher in EU8, and vice versa if 1<rygr . The relative investments per 
labor-unit growth ratio (rigr) measure the growth of investment per labor-unit in EU8 with 
respect to the growth of investment per labor-unit in EU15. If 1>rigr , then the growth of 
investment per labor-unit is higher in EU8, and vice versa if 1<rigr . 
 
Using these two relative coefficients we can establish the extent by which the growth rates of 
investment per labor-unit and the growth rates of labor productivity were higher or smaller in 
EU8 with respect to EU15. 
 
Figure 3: Relative growth ratio of investments per labor-unit and relative growth ratio of labor 
productivity 
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Symbols: rigr – relative investments per labor-unit growth ratio,  
 rygr  – relative labor productivity growth ratio.  
Note: The horizontal axis indicates each separate economies, the vertical axes measures relative 
growth coefficient of investments per labor-unit and of labor productivity. 
Growth rates for EU8 and EU15 economies were estimated as the weighted geometric mean, 
where share of labor force in a separate economy was used as weight.  
 
Source: Own estimates.  
 
Graphical presentation of relative investments per labor-unit growth indicates that in the first 
two years this growth was faster in the case of EU15 economies. This is related with the fact 
that the two largest economies of the EU8 group experienced in 1997 and 1998 a decline of 
investments per labor-unit growth rates. However in the following years the growth rate of 
investments per labor-unit was continuously lower in EU15 economies with respect to EU8. 
On the other hand the labor productivity growth in the whole period was higher in the case of 
EU8 economies. Following this we accept two basic conclusions: 
• first, the growth of investment per labor-unit in EU8 was higher than in EU15, and 
furthermore the difference had grown during the period 1996–2004; 
• second, the growth of labor productivity in EU8 was higher than in EU15, but this 
difference was diminishing during the period 1996–2004.  
 
So far, nothing unusual can be recognized from the presented empirics. But, if we compare 
the relative investments per labor-unit growth rate with relative labor productivity growth 
rate, we recognize an interesting picture reflecting the growth performance of EU8 economies 
with respect to EU15. On the one hand we establish that the growth of investment per labor-
unit in EU8 becomes higher from year to year, but on the other hand the growth of labor 
productivity in EU8 diminishes from year to year with respect to EU15, and this in the 
circumstances where the selected former transition countries achieved on average 
approximately only 60 % of the labor productivity level, which holds on average for selected 
advanced EU15 countries. Hence the central problem is the diminishing dynamic of real 
convergence between EU8 and EU15 countries under circumstances of growing disparities in 
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investment growth per labor-unit in favor of EU8 countries and the significant distance of 
labor productivity in EU8 with respect to EU15.  
 
To describe the problem more explicitly, we calculate an additional indicator that is a 
derivative from the relative real gross domestic product growth ratio (rygr) and from the 
relative investment growth ratio (rigr). We term it as the derivative relative output-investment 
growth ratio (dryigr): 
 rigr
rygrdryigr = , (3)
Symbols: dryigr  – derivate relative output-investment growth ratio, 
 rygr  – relative labor productivity growth ratio, 
 rigr – relative investments growth ratio, 
Source: Own composition.  
 
We calculate the derivative relative output-investment ratio (dryigr) for the selected groups 
of economies (EU8 with respect to EU15) for the period 1996–2004 (see Figure 4) and 
establish that at the beginning of the period the coefficient was greater than one, but has been 
continuously diminishing, and after the year 1999 becomes smaller than 1. After the year 
1999, the higher growth of investment per labor-unit in EU8 with respect to EU15 has not 
spilt over into the higher growth of real gross domestic product per labor-unit.  
 
Figure 4: Ratio between the growth of labor productivity and growth of real investment per labor-unit in 
EU8 with respect to EU15 
 
 
 
Note: For calculations we use the data from the Eurostat database. The initial data on real gross 
value added and real gross capital formation (investment) are measured in millions of 1995 
euros (in converting the values from national currencies into euros the purchasing power 
parity standard exchange rate was used). Initial data on the labor force were measured in 
thousands of employees adjusted for the full-time equivalent. 
The full line indicates the actual value of the derivative relative coefficient, and the 
interrupted line indicates estimated values of the polynomial time-trend.  
The horizontal axis measures the time in years (t), and the vertical axis measures the value of  
the derivative relative labor productivity-investments growth ratio (dryigr).  
 
Source: Own calculations.  
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A value of the derivative relative output-investment growth ratio (dryigr) that is less than 1 
indicates that, if the growth of investments per labor-unit in EU8 exceeds the growth of 
investment per labor-unit in EU15 by 1 index point, then the growth of labor productivity in 
EU8 will exceed the growth of labor productivity in EU15 by less than 1 index point. The 
latter statement implies that if the growth of investments per labor-unit were to be identical in 
both economies (EU8 and EU15), then the growth of labor productivity would be higher in 
the EU15, although because of the integration process the main obstacles to technology 
transfer, mobility of physical capital, differences in institutions (legislations) and human 
capital composition between the EU8 and the EU15 have been removed.  
 
As we highlighted in the introduction, this outcome is contrary to the theoretical expectations, 
since both group of economies have access to the same production technology and dispose 
with the same amount of human capital. Due to the constraints of length, we omit an in-depth 
analysis on this assumption. However, the analysis by Barro and Lee (2001) confirms that 
transition economies obtained the same human capital as advanced market economies. Also 
Žižmond and Novak (2006) and Žižmond and Novak (2007) have provided explicit empirical 
evidence about technology convergence between EU8 and EU15 economies. Therefore we 
take the assumption on equalities between EU8 and EU15 economies to be appropriate.  
 
2 Technical inefficiency as an impeding factor of real convergence between 
EU8 and EU15 economies 
 
As we highlighted in the introduction, the divergence prediction of labor productivity growth 
between economies under the homogeneity conditions is contrary to the modern growth 
theory. By developing our original theoretically consistent solution to the described problem, 
our starting point was the belief that the main factor for different growth outcomes is technical 
inefficiency, despite the existence of identical initial conditions.  
 
Technical inefficiency is a characteristic of a production process, which indicates that the 
actual point of production by the given amount of used production factors lies below the 
production possibility frontier. Furthermore, the problem of technical inefficiency is also in 
line with empirical comparison of the economic growth characteristics between selected 
groups of economies (EU8 and EU15) in the period 1996–2004 (see Figure 4), where the 
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increase of the relative investment growth rate per labor-unit and decrease of relative real 
gross domestic product growth rate per labor-unit is significant for the selected time period.  
 
Most macroeconomic empirical analyses of an aggregate production that permits technical 
inefficiency, and hence decomposition of the total factor productivity growth into the 
technological progress and the growth of technical efficiency, were done for USA (Färe et al. 
1994, Pires and Garcia 2004), for East-Asia countries: South-Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Japan (Sun 2002, Bloch and Tang 1999, Chen 1997, Felipe 1999, Kim and Lau 1996, 
Mahadevan and Kalirajan 1999, Mahadevan 2002), for former centrally planned economies 
(Nishimizu and Page 1982, Sickles, Good and Getawech 2002) and for developed market 
economies in West Europe (Sickles, Good and Getawech 2002).  
 
If we summarize the central findings of the quoted references, we can establish that: 
• the main impact of technical efficiency growth on the economic growth is significant 
for Taiwan, South-Korea, Singapore;  
• economic growth of the USA and of developed market economies in West Europe was 
mainly determined by the technological progress and not by the growth of technical 
efficiency – this implies that the actual point of production in these economies was 
close to the production possibility frontier; and 
• technological progress had a significant impact on economic growth of the centrally 
planned economies, although their actual point of production was significantly below 
the production possibility frontier – especially in the period 1980–1990, which 
indicates rising technical inefficiency. 
 
The final conclusions fully support the idea about the importance of technical efficiency for 
the economic growth of former transition countries and for convergence of their real gross 
domestic product per labor-unit with respect to advanced market economies. 
 
However, in order to apply the concept of technical in(efficiency) to the analysis of economic 
growth at the aggregate level, we have to divide a national economy into different sectors 
(industries), since the central cause for technical inefficiency is inefficient employment of 
disposable production factors into different productions. The analysis of economic growth by 
dividing the economy into separate sectors of production (or industries) is not new in 
economic theory. The same concept was used by Romer (1987 and 1990), who divided the 
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economy as a whole into two different sectors. The first sector produces specialized 
intermediate goods, equipped with progressing new technology (this is the R&D sector), and 
the second sector produces goods aimed at final consumption by using the advanced 
intermediate products from the R&D sector. The growing employment of labor in the first 
sector expands the number of new technologically advanced products that avoid the tendency 
of diminishing returns and assure sustainable permanent long-run economic growth of an 
economy. 
 
Romer has developed a convenient framework for explaining the sources of technological 
progress that was adapted to the neoclassical growth theory, but this framework omits the 
impact of technical inefficiency. For these reasons we search for solutions within the 
alternative and/or supplementary post-Keynesian theory of economic growth, founded on 
approval from Bellais (2004) which recognizes the investment of a single firm into 
development and/or adoption of new technology as the driving force for long-run growth. 
According to this statement it is not meaningful to divide firms and hence industries by the 
criteria of whether they produced new, technologically advanced intermediate goods or 
services, or not. Much more important is the question of whether each firm, regardless of 
whether or not it produced new technology intended for intermediate consumption or goods 
intended for final consumption, has the ability to finance the development or adoption of a 
new technology or not. The firm that has this ability has also the perspective of further 
development and growth. Following this interpretation we can cluster all firms in an economy 
into two separate sectors; the first sector, termed as propulsive industries, comprises all firms 
that have the ability and possibility to finance investments in new technology, and the second 
sector, termed as degressive industries, includes firms without this ability.  
 
The approach, dividing industries into degressive and propulsive, and not according to Romer 
(1987, 1990) into R&D and non-R&D, enables us to define technical inefficiency at the 
aggregate level as an inefficient allocation of production factors (physical and human capital) 
between propulsive and degressive industries. Because propulsive industries assure a 
perspective of future growth and hence higher returns with respect to degressive industries, 
the physical capital (investments) is concentrated in the propulsive industries; consequently 
these industries do not confront the problem connected with the possibility of financing new 
investments and adopting new available technology. But physical capital, as a production 
factor, determines only the potential amount of new technology adoption. Whether this 
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potential will also be turned to advantage depends on the disposable human capital. And if the 
vast amount of human capital is concentrated in the degressive industries,4 the propulsive 
industries face the problem of absorptive capacities of new technologies although they have 
the ability to finance investments in new technologies. As the opposite to this, the degressive 
industries have an excess capacity of human capital but are short of physical capital to finance 
new technologies.  
 
The described allocation of production factors (physical and human capital) between 
propulsive and degressive industries, pictures out the problem of technical inefficiency from 
the point of view of national economy. Namely, if we could reallocate physical capital from 
the propulsive towards degressive industries, the latter would no longer face the problem of 
financing investments for new technologies, and – because they have at their disposal 
sufficient amounts of human capital – nor would the absorption of new technologies be 
restricted.  
 
Reallocation of physical capital from industries with a relatively small amount of human 
capital towards industries with a relatively large amount of human capital will raise technical 
efficiency and hence economic growth. The same effect (the growth of technical efficiency 
and hence economic growth) will be realized also, if the human capital is reallocated from 
degressive towards propulsive industries. In this case, the amount of human capital in 
degressive industries will diminish, which will be in line with the relatively smaller amount of 
physical capital, but will rise in propulsive industries that will advance the absorptive 
capacities of new technology in these industries and accelerate the economic growth from the 
aggregate point of view.  
 
Obviously a decrease in technical inefficiency or an increase in technical efficiency can be 
achieved through the reallocation of production factors between propulsive and degressive 
industries. The question that remains open is: the reallocation of which one of the exposed 
production factors is crucial? Probably, the acknowledgement that physical capital moves 
towards industries with relatively high returns and prospects for future growth, is not 
questionable. Therefore it will be an illusion to expect that physical capital will be reallocated 
                                                 
4 Brown and Earle (2002) gave proof for this in the case of transition countries. 
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from existing propulsive industries towards existing degressive industries. Hence the weight 
of reallocation is placed on human capital from degressive towards propulsive industries.  
 
3 Composition of the two-sector growth model 
 
The approach aimed at modeling aggregate economic growth on the basis of the sectoral 
model is not new but has been widely used for instance by Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988) and 
Romer (1990). But introduction of the sectoral component into the growth models, aimed at 
explaining a convergence or even more a divergence of economic growth between economies, 
is connected with expansion of differences in initial conditions. In contrast to this approach 
our original hypothesis is focused on prediction of a divergence between economies with the 
same initial conditions and with equal growth of physical capital. According to this, the aim 
of this chapter is to develop a two-sector growth model that will be in line with the defined 
hypothesis.  
 
The evaluation base of the original growth model is a clustering of industries of an economy 
into two separate sectors. The first sector comprises all industries with their ability and 
possibility to finance investments in new technology that enhance the future growth. These 
are the so-called propulsive industries. The second sector comprises all industries without this 
ability, termed as degressive industries.  
 
An economy as a whole has at its disposal the technology level T (that determines the static 
production possibility frontier for both sectors and for the economy as a whole), amount of 
human capital H (that determines the dynamic production possibility frontier), amount of 
physical capital K and amount of workers, which form jointly with their human capital (HC) 
the disposable amount of effective labor force (ELF).  
 
The initial conditions and the frontiers of economic growth of this economy are graphically 
presented in Figure 5 below. According to the disposable technology and to the disposable 
amount of human capital, the economy can reach a potential level of gross domestic product 
per labor-unit at *y  if it employs *k  units of physical capital per labor-unit; i.e. due to 
disposable technology and human capital at the aggregate level the potential production point 
is ( )*** , ykA . 
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Figure 5: Impact of capital deepening on economic growth 
 
 
 
Symbols: y  – labor productivity,  
 k  – capital-labor ratio,  
Note: We use the term dynamic production possibility frontier due to the fact that its shape is 
determined at the different levels of production technology. The static production 
possibility frontier will be pictured as a horizontal line at a certain level of labor 
productivity.  
 
Source: Own composition.   
 
The actual point of production ( )ykA ,  lies below the potential one (but still on the dynamic 
production possibility frontier, which implies that all available technology is incorporated into 
the physical capital), due to the fact that *kk < . Consequently there exists a potential for 
economic growth solely on the basis of capital deepening that will not encounter the problem 
of negative marginal productivity of physical capital.  
 
Next we divide the economy into two different sectors: propulsive industries and degressive 
industries. Both industries have at their disposable the technology level T, but physical and 
human capital are allocated among both industries according to the following condition: 
 dp KKK += , (4)
 dp ELFELFELF += . 
Symbols: K  – amount of physical capital at the aggregate level, 
 pK  – amount of physical capital in propulsive industries, 
 dK  – amount of physical capital in degressive industries, 
 ELF  – amount of effective labor force at the aggregate level, 
 pELF  – amount of effective labor force in propulsive industries, 
 dELF  – amount of effective labor force in degressive industries, 
 t  – time period. 
Source: Own composition.  
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We start with the sector of propulsive industries which employs pK  units of physical capital 
and pHC  units of human capital, henceforth the physical capital per labor-unit of propulsive 
industries equals pk . The shape of the dynamic production possibility frontier of propulsive 
industries is determined by the disposable amount of human capital of these industries. While 
a part of human capital is employed also in degressive industries, the shape of the sectoral 
production possibility frontier lies below the shape of the aggregate dynamic production 
possibility frontier (Figure 6 below). 
 
Figure 6: Dynamic production possibility frontier for the sector of propulsive industries 
 
 
 
Note: For explanation of symbols see Figure 5.  
Source: Own composition.   
 
The aggregate dynamic production possibility frontier from Figure 6 is the same as in Figure 
5, with the actual point of production ( )ykA ,  and a potential one ( )*** , ykA . The second 
dynamic production possibility frontier in Figure 6 is aimed at propulsive industries. The 
actual point of production of these industries measures the amount of gross domestic product 
per labor-unit of effective labor force ( )py  that is produced by the given amount of physical 
capital per labor-unit ( )pk . The actual point of production of propulsive industries ( )ppp ykA ,  
lies below the potential one, due to the fact that *pp kk < . Additional investments into physical 
capital by the given amount of human capital and by the given technological frontier, will 
stimulate the growth of gross domestic product per labor-unit. But additional investments in 
propulsive industries have a positive impact on economic growth until *pp kk <  by regarding 
the technology and amount of human capital as unchanged. If the physical capital-labor ratio 
exceeds the level *pk  the propulsive industries will face the problem of negative marginal 
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productivity of physical capital. This is an important implication, which indicates that growth 
of investments obtained at the aggregate level does not necessarily have a positive impact on 
aggregate growth. A positive impact of investments on the aggregate economic growth 
depends on their distribution among industries. Furthermore, this finding has important 
implications also for convergence predictions and brings to the forefront the impact of 
production factors growth allocation among industries. Next, following this issue, we describe 
the production possibility frontier of degressive industries.  
 
Degressive industries have also the technology level T at their disposal and employ dK  
amount of physical capital and dHC  amount of human capital. As we know, the amount of 
disposable human capital forms the shape of the dynamic production possibility frontier. Due 
to the fact that a certain amount of an economy’s human capital is employed in propulsive 
industries, the shape of the dynamic production possibility frontier of degressive industries is 
below the shape of the aggregate dynamic production possibility frontier (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Dynamic production possibility frontier for the sector of degressive industries 
 
 
 
Note: For explanation of symbols see Figure 5.  
Source: Own composition.   
 
By the given amount of physical capital per unit of effective labor force ( )dk , degressive 
industries’ gross domestic product per labor-unit amounts to dy . Regarding the disposable 
amount of human capital employed in degressive industries the potential amount of gross 
domestic product per unit of effective labor force is at *dy  and will be reached if the physical 
capital-labor ratio increases from dk  towards dk . However, if the capital-labor ratio exceeds 
the level *dk , then negative impact on economic growth will occur. In this case the disposable 
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amount of human capital will be fully exhausted, hence the law of negative marginal 
productivity of physical capital applies in case of its growth extending over the desired level 
*
dk . 
 
Up to this point the actual production point ( )ykA ,  lies below the potential production point 
( )*** , ykA , which implies that the economy can enhance its economic growth solely on the 
basis of additional investments. Due to the technology and human capital constraints the 
maximum growth of physical capital per labor-unit is from k  towards *k . But, as we 
emphasized by description of the dynamic production possibility frontier for propulsive and 
for degressive industries, not only the growth of physical capital per labor-unit affected the 
aggregate growth, but so too did the allocation of additional units of physical capital among 
propulsive and degressive industries. At the aggregate level the potential production point 
( )*** , ykA  will be achieved only if the physical capital-labor ratio in propulsive industries 
rises from pk  towards 
*
pk  and at the same time in the degressive industries from dk  towards 
*
dk  by the given allocation of human capital among these two sectors. 
 
4 Convergence – divergence prediction  
 
Following the established two-sector growth model, the sectoral allocation of human capital 
and physical capital between propulsive and degressive industries importantly affects the 
impact of new investments on the economic growth at the aggregate level. If we continue our 
analysis from the previous chapter we recognize that the actual production point (A) of the 
economy lies below its potential level ( )*A , where solely the growth of physical capital – 
which will close the gap between k  and *k  – can move the actual production point towards 
the potential one. We mark the change of physical capital per unit of effective labor force at 
the aggregate level as kΔ  that equals .* kk −   
 
The supposed growth of physical capital at the aggregate level can be obtained also at the 
sectoral level. We work with two sectors, the propulsive one and the degressive one, where 
the aggregate growth of physical capital is allocated among these two sectors according to the 
following condition: .dp kkk Δ+Δ=Δ  This condition implies that the sum of sectoral growth 
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of physical capital per unit of effective labor force can not exceed the growth of physical 
capital per unit of effective labor force at the aggregate level.  
 
By the given level of technology (which is the same for both sectors and for the economy as a 
whole) and by the given amount of human capital, each of the two sectors has a desired 
amount of physical capital per labor-unit that should not be exceeded. If it is, the law of 
negative marginal productivity applies, which impedes the aggregate economic growth.  
 
As we know, in our case, the physical capital-effective labor force ratio in degressive 
industries should not exceed the level *dk  and in the case of propulsive industries the level 
*
pk . 
The principal problem is that there is no automatic assurance that the change of physical 
capital per unit of effective labor force will be allocated among both sectors according to the 
conditions: *ppp kkk ≤Δ+  and ,*ddd kkk ≤Δ+  where it holds that ., kkk dp Δ=Δ+Δ  It is quite 
possible that the greater part of physical capital per labor-unit growth will be allocated to the 
propulsive industries which exceeds the level *pk . On the other hand, the growth of physical 
capital per unit of effective labor force is minor in degressive industries, consequently the 
physical capital-effective labor force ratio remains below its desired level *dk .  
 
An economy can experience three different proportions of allocation of the aggregate growth 
of physical capital per labor-unit: 
• First, the kΔ  is allocated among propulsive and degressive industries according to the 
following conditions: *ppp kkk =Δ+  and ,*ddd kkk =Δ+  where .dp kkk Δ+Δ=Δ  
• Second, the kΔ  is allocated among propulsive and degressive industries according to 
the following conditions: *ppp kkk ≥Δ+  and ,*ddd kkk ≤Δ+  where .dp kkk Δ+Δ=Δ  
• Third, the kΔ  is allocated among propulsive and degressive industries according to 
the following conditions: *ppp kkk ≤Δ+  and ,*ddd kkk ≥Δ+  where .dp kkk Δ+Δ=Δ  
 
Let us suppose, first, that the economy experiences the distribution of physical capital per unit 
of effective labor force growth which maximizes aggregate economic growth. Graphically 
this is presented in Figure 8 below.  
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Initially the amount of gross domestic product per 
labor-unit is equal to the *y  which is the total of 
gross domestic product per labor-unit produced in 
propulsive industries ( )py  and in degressive 
industries ( )dy . Next, the amount of physical 
capital per labor-unit in degressive industries rises 
from dk  towards 
*
dk . Consequently the gross 
domestic product per labor-unit rises from dy  
towards *dy , which is equal to the potential amount 
of gross domestic product per unit of effective labor 
force in degressive industries due to the disposable 
amount of human capital and at the given 
technology. The physical capital-labor ratio rises 
also in propulsive industries from pk  towards 
*
pk , 
thus generating the growth of gross domestic 
product per labor-unit in propulsive industries from 
py  towards 
*
py , which is the potential level in 
propulsive industries due to the disposable amount 
of human capital and to the given technology. If we 
sum up the changes of physical capital-labor ratios 
between both sectors we obtain the aggregate 
growth of this ratio: .kkk dp Δ=Δ+Δ  At the 
aggregate level the obtained growth of physical 
capital per labor-unit is related with the change of 
gross domestic product per unit of effective labor 
force from y towards *y .  
 
This is the potential production point determined by the given amount of human capital and 
disposable production technology at the aggregate level. Additional growth of physical capital 
above the level *k  will be unproductive, and negative marginal productivity of physical 
capital will occur.  
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In the above described case the change of physical 
capital per labor-unit at the aggregate level was 
allocated among propulsive and degressive 
industries according to the conditions: 
*
ppp kkk ≤Δ+  and ,*ddd kkk ≤Δ+  where 
., kkk dp Δ=Δ+Δ  In this case, gross domestic 
product converges from the initial level towards the 
potential level on the basis of capital deepening. 
 
Next we assume that the growth of physical capital 
per labor-unit is allocated among propulsive and 
degressive industries according to the following 
conditions: *ppp kkk ≥Δ+  and .*ddd kkk ≤Δ+  
Graphically this is presented in Figure 9. Growth of 
physical capital per labor-unit at the aggregate level 
is in this case the same as previously (from 1k  
towards *k ), but irrespective of this, the growth of 
gross domestic product per labor-unit is smaller 
(from 1y  towards 2y where 12 yy < ). The actual 
point of production after the increase in the 
physical capital-labor ratio stays below the 
potential production point ( )*A , where the 
difference between ( )*A  and ( )2A  is a measure of 
technical inefficiency at the aggregate level. 
 
The obtained technical inefficiency at the aggregate level has occurred because of unbalanced 
distribution of physical capital growth at the aggregate level between propulsive and 
degressive industries. The optimality criteria are defined by the amount of human capital that 
is disposable to each sector. The sector with the greater extent of human capital has the 
greater ability productively to absorb technologies incorporated in physical capital. In our 
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case, propulsive industries possess a greater amount of human capital than degressive 
industries, henceforth the greater part of physical capital per labor-unit growth should be 
realized in these industries. This was also realized but, unfortunately, the increase of physical 
capital- labor ratio in propulsive industries was too extended. Hence the amount of physical 
capital per labor-unit in these industries exceeds the desired level *pk  and allows the law of 
negative marginal productivity of physical capital to be applied. In contrast to the produced 
amount of gross domestic product per labor-unit is smaller than its potential amount.  
 
On the other hand, degressive industries face the opposite constraints. They have at their 
disposal a sufficient amount of human capital, but they face insufficient increase of the 
physical capital-labor ratio. The ratio has grown from 1,dk  towards 2,dk , which is below the 
desired level *dk . Consequently, the actual production point stays below the potential one. 
Both sectors produce less than potentially they could by the given growth of physical capital 
in the economy – one sector is overloaded with physical capital per labor-unit (due to the 
human capital constraints) and the other one suffers from the low value of physical capital 
with respect to disposable human capital.   
 
Finally, we assume that the aggregate growth of physical capital per labor-unit from 1k  
towards *k  is allocated among propulsive and degressive industries according to the 
following conditions: *ppp kkk ≤Δ+  and .*ddd kkk ≥Δ+  Graphically this is presented in 
Figure 10.  
 
As in both previous cases, growth of physical capital per labor-unit at the aggregate level is 
also in this case the same (from 1k  towards 
*k ), where the greater part of physical capital-
labor ratio growth is allocated into degressive industries. Consequently the achieved level of 
physical capital per labor-unit in degressive industries exceeds its desired level *dk , which 
enhances the negative marginal productivity of physical capital. In contrast to the degressive 
industries, propulsive industries in this case suffer from too low amount of physical capital 
per labor-unit due to the disposable amount of physical capital. In propulsive industries the 
physical capital-labor ratio rises from 1,pk  towards 2,pk , that is below the desired level 
*
pk , 
therefore the actual production point of these industries stays below the potential one. 
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If we total the sectoral levels of gross domestic 
product per labor-unit and relate this sum with the 
aggregate growth of physical capital we obtain the 
actual production point ( )2A  which is below the 
potential production point ( )*A ; i.e. due to 
inappropriate allocation of physical capital growth 
between propulsive and degressive industries with 
respect to allocation of human capital, the capital 
deepening accelerates divergence of the actual 
production point from its potential level.  
 
However, we have to be aware that the extent of 
technical inefficiency at the aggregate level in the 
last two cases was different although the aggregate 
change of physical capital-labor ratio was the same. 
The obtained difference in extent of technical 
inefficiency is related to the difference, depending 
on which sector was overloaded with physical 
capital. First, the propulsive industries were 
overloaded with physical capital per labor-unit. 
Due to the inappropriate amount of human capital, 
the disposable amount of physical capital could not 
have been efficiently used, hence in propulsive 
industries the negative marginal productivity of 
physical capital applied. Irrespective of this, at the 
aggregate level gross domestic product per labor-
unit of effective labor force grew from 1y  towards 
2y  (Figure 9). And in cases when degressive 
industries were overloaded with physical capital per 
labor-unit, this sector faced the problem of negative 
marginal productivity of physical capital (Figure 
10). 
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However in this case at the aggregate level we obtained only a minor growth of gross 
domestic product per labor-unit. This clearly indicates that if the greater part of aggregate 
physical capital growth per labor-unit is allocated into the sector with a smaller amount of 
disposable human capital, the divergence accelerates and vice versa.  
 
Three major conclusions can be drawn from the above described analysis: 
• First, an economy will converge from its actual point of production towards its 
potential point on the basis of capital deepening only when the aggregate growth of 
physical capital per labor-unit will be allocated among propulsive and degressive 
industries according to their endowment with human capital. 
• Second, capital deepening in case of its inappropriate distribution among propulsive 
and degressive industries, which is not in line with their human capital endowment, 
causes convergence of the actual production point with respect to the potential 
production point. 
• Third, divergence of the actual production point with respect to its potential level 
accelerates when the greater part of aggregate physical capital per labor-unit growth is 
allocated into industries with a relatively small amount of human capital. 
 
5 Theoretical prediction of real convergence between EU8 and EU15 
economies by using the two-sector growth model 
 
In the previous chapter we developed and used the two-sector growth model for analyzing the 
convergence (divergence) prediction of the actual production point towards (away) from its 
potential level theoretically. In this chapter we use all previously obtained conclusions with 
the aim of predicting divergence between EU8 and EU15 economies under the assumption 
that both economies face the same endowments with human capital, have access to the same 
production technology, and experience equal growth of investments per labor-unit.5  
 
                                                 
5 These conditions are in line with those we realized in the introduction as we described the basic problem of real 
convergence between EU15 (i.e. benchmark) economies and EU8 (i.e. initial) economies. We established that 
relatively higher growth of investments per labor-unit in EU8 economies with respect to EU15 economies has 
not spilt over into the relatively higher growth of real gross domestic product per labor-unit. The recognized 
convergence problem between EU15 and EU8 economies can also be expressed as a problem where both groups 
of economies (EU8 and EU15) have the same initial production point and experience the same growth of 
physical capital, although the outcomes of gross domestic product per labor-unit growth are different and in 
favor of the EU8 economies. 
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As we recognized by reviewing the growth literature, the divergence in such a case where two 
economies have the same initial production point and the same growth of physical capital per 
labor-unit is possible due to following reasons: 
• there exists a difference in disposable production technologies and/or 
• there exists a difference in amount of human capital and/or 
• there exists a difference in institutional framework. 
 
If only one of the above recognized differences holds, any model recognized in the growth 
theory (aggregate as well sectoral) will predict divergence. But if we restrict the prediction 
with the assumption that there are no differences in initial conditions between EU15 and EU8 
economies, these models will predict convergence, not divergence.  
 
However, the two-sector growth, which distinguishes between propulsive and degressive 
industries, enables us to predict divergence between two homogeneous groups of economies. 
The divergence between them can occur due to differences in technical inefficiency that are 
caused by the unbalanced distribution of physical capital with respect to the human capital 
between propulsive and degressive industries. Graphically, the described problem is presented 
in Figure 11 below.  
 
Figure 11: Convergence prediction between the initial and benchmark economy 
 
 
 
Note: For explanation of symbols see Figure 5.   
Source: Own composition.   
 
In the case of a benchmark economy that is treated as the technology leader, and the initial 
economy is the technology follower. According to our assumptions both economies have the 
same dynamic production possibility frontier and the same initial production point (A1) at the 
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initial physical capital-labor ratio (k1). However, the initial economy has the greater part of its 
human capital concentrated in degressive industries, which causes a relatively greater extent 
of technical inefficiency at the aggregate level with respect to the benchmark economy. 
Subsequently the same growth of physical capital per labor-unit generates relatively greater 
labor productivity growth in the case of the benchmark economy than in the case of the initial 
economy. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this article was to expose the weaknesses of modern theory of economic growth in 
the segment that deals with convergence prediction between economies. Our main critique of 
the present growth models aimed at predicting convergence between economies is that they 
suffer from a basic disadvantage – they are unable to predict the divergence between 
homogeneous group of economies. 
 
As we described in the first chapter, we recognize this disadvantage by analyzing labor 
productivity growth performance between 8 advanced transition economies that joined the EU 
in May 2004, and 15 advanced market economies that constituted the EU till May 2004. We 
accept the critique that EU8 and EU15 economies are not fully homogeneous, however we 
have to take into account that both groups of economies form the common economic 
integration (European Union), therefore the differences between these economies have been 
diminishing over time.   
 
In the paper we present an original solution to the obtained problem, and have presented the 
so called two sector growth model that distinguishes between the propulsive and the 
degressive industries. As we highlighted, the approach to modeling aggregate growth by 
implementing the sectoral approach to economic growth is not new, however, one may 
consider as original the idea about the propulsivity of an industry. And as we demonstrated, 
this model is able to predict the divergence of labor productivity growth between economies 
that possess the same human capital, have access to the same production technology, and 
experience the same growth of investments per labor unit. We believe that, from the economic 
theory point of view, the developed model exhibits consistency and appropriate explanation 
power for convergence or divergence prediction, therefore the forthcoming research efforts 
will be focused on its empirical evaluation.    
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